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risk-free versions of providence, but that it does worse. One central issue
concerning the morality of risk is how the risk is distributed among those
involved in the event. Welty points out that whatever the risks are that
God takes, he does not suffer from them the way human beings often do.
Welty asks a series of questions such as, “Will [God] perish due to lack of
food, water, shelter, and good health? No.” This one question is enough
to see that for all the talk of God’s risks, on open theism, it is the creatures that are most vulnerable. There is at least a prima facie case that God
is more morally responsible if he adopts risky providence by creating a
world with an open future than if he maintains a risk-free providence.
Welty’s essay is simply excellent. His treatment of these themes is very
careful. He draws on the writings of open theists as he lays out the details
of the four relevant aspects of the problem of evil. In addition, he raises
relevant objections to his assessments and answers them. This chapter will
provide impetus for continued work for years to come.
In a short review, I can do no more than gesture at the contents of this
book. Many of the essays warrant a deeper look. The collection as a whole
has several strengths that are worth mentioning. First, the papers vary
widely in topic and in philosophical perspective. They range over several
metaphysical issues as well as issues more central to philosophical theology. The collection demonstrates that issues related to divine foreknowledge touch a wider variety of the different fields within philosophy than
might be expected. The authors also vary in their philosophical commitments. Some are compatibilists and some are libertarians. Some are atemporalists and some hold that God is temporal. This diversity strengthens
the collection. Third, the quality of each essay is very good. Both open
theists and critics of open theism will find much to think about. I highly
recommend this work.

Petitionary Prayer: A Philosophical Investigation, by Scott Davison. Oxford
University Press, 2017. Pp. vi + 189. $75.00 (hardcover).
KATE FINLEY, Hope College
Scott Davison orients his investigation of petitionary prayer around the
following pair of questions: “Assuming that the God of traditional theism
exists, is it reasonable to think that God answers specific petitionary
prayers? Or are those prayers pointless in the sense that they do not influence God’s action?” (7–8). Davison begins by admitting that he originally planned to argue that the answers to those questions are no and yes,
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respectively. However, in the course of his investigation he realized he
could only defend the much more moderate claim that some petitionary
prayer is likely pointless. I appreciate Davison’s clear articulation of both
the intentional limitations and modest goals of his investigation. He states
many times that he is addressing an “artificial philosopher’s question”
(8) in that he is examining petitionary prayer only insofar as it is a way
to potentially influence God, and in that he is carrying out this examination by focusing exclusively on the overlap between petitionary prayer
and various mainstream philosophical issues. This approach enables
him to address a wide range of issues lucidly and insightfully. To make
sense of the relationships between the many topics that he covers, we can
group the chapters into four sections. In the first section (chapters 1 and
2) Davison makes note of important distinctions and definitions, and also
presents his main positive account of petitionary prayer. In the second section (chapters 3, 6, 7, and 8) he addresses mainly metaphysical and ethical
issues relating to petitionary prayer, and in the third section (chapters 4
and 5) he addresses epistemological issues. Finally, in the fourth section
(chapters 9 and 10) he addresses the relationship between faith and prayer
as well as some practical reasons in favor of petitionary prayer, in addition
to summarizing the rest of the book.
In his first two chapters, Davison presents his account of what petitionary prayers are and what it means for God to answer them. He distinguishes
types of petitionary prayer from tokens (those offered by a particular person or group, in a particular time and place) and identifies the three main
components of a petitionary prayer: 1) the petitioning subject; 2) the act
of requesting (through petitionary prayer); and 3) the object requested.
The object requested in a petitionary prayer may be a substance, event, or
state of affairs and may be requested for oneself (self-directed petitionary
prayer) or someone else (other-directed petitionary prayer). Davison then
analyzes what it means for God to answer a petitionary prayer, highlighting three components. God answers S’s petitionary prayer requesting E iff:
1) God brings about E (if not, God at most merely responds to the prayer); 2)
God desires to bring about E just because S prayed for it (note that this desire need not serve as God’s only reason for bringing about E); 3) this desire
is an essential component of a “true contrastive explanation” (38) of God’s
bringing about E rather than not (in other words, an explanation of why
God brought about E would fail if this desire was absent from it). Davison
sees this, his Contrastive Reasons Account (CRA), as a middle way between accounts of petitionary prayer that require too much (like counterfactual dependence accounts) and those that require too little (like Pruss’s
omnirationality account. After establishing his account of petitionary
prayer, Davison addresses the following two questions in the remainder
of the book: (1) Does this account of petitionary prayer fit with what we
believe about God (in particular, what we believe about God’s freedom
and goodness)? And (2) Can we know that God has answered a particular
petitionary prayer of ours?
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In chapters 3, 6, 7 and 8, Davison addresses specific versions of the first
question. In chapter 3, he focuses on how competing theories of divine
freedom might challenge his account of petitionary prayer. After thoroughly evaluating various challenges he concludes that none pose significant problems for the traditional theist. In chapters 6 and 7, he addresses
the apparent tension between God’s goodness and petitionary prayer: if
petitionary prayer is efficacious, God’s provision of at least some good
things depends on us offering certain petitionary prayers. Most defenses
of petitionary prayer argue that some good is significant enough to justify this setup. Davison examines many such defenses and finds most
lacking, particularly when applied to cases in which God’s provision of
important goods depends on petitionary prayers. However, he does find
responsibility-based defenses of other-directed prayer promising—those
that identify increased human responsibility of the sort made possible
by petitionary prayer, as a “significant enough” good. In chapter 8, he
turns to defenses of self-directed prayer, two of which he finds promising. One is the autonomy defense (a modified version of a defense offered
by Stump) of self-directed prayers for permission-required direct divine
goods. According to this defense, in order to preserve our autonomy in
certain cases, God requires self-directed petitionary prayers before changing things like one’s tendency towards sinful behavior. Davison also finds
the modified case-by-case defense (versions of which have been offered by
Murray, Meyers, and Flint) promising for a limited set of self- and otherdirected petitionary prayers. According to this defense, God determines
whether to require petitionary prayers on an individual basis rather than
according to a general policy. The upshot of these chapters is that there are
only a few promising defenses of petitionary prayer, and these defenses
are limited in application to specific types of petitionary prayer.
In chapters 4 and 5, Davison engages with the second question mentioned above: whether we can know that God has answered a particular
petitionary prayer of ours. He explains that, according to many theistic
traditions, we can know both that God, in general, answers petitionary
prayers, and that God has historically answered some particular petitionary
prayers; however, this does not settle the question of whether or not I can
know that God has answered my petitionary prayer. In chapter 4, Davison
addresses challenges to our ability to have such knowledge, ultimately
identifying the safety-based challenge as most worrisome. According to
this challenge if I pray for E and God brings about E, I cannot know that
God has answered my prayer because there are nearby possible worlds
in which God brings about E for reasons independent of my petitionary
prayer, but in which I still believe that God has answered my prayer. In
this case, the third criterion of Davison’s CRA is unfulfilled—I cannot know
whether God has answered a particular prayer of mine because I do not
know his reasons for bringing something about. In chapter 5, Davison
examines particular Christian teachings to determine whether they can
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justify our claims to such knowledge—concluding that they cannot. The
upshot of these chapters is that, claiming to have “knowledge of specific
answered petitionary prayers” is, at best, highly dubious.
In his final two chapters, he briefly addresses additional practical puzzles for, and reasons in favor of, petitionary prayer, as well as interesting
connections between faith and petitionary prayer. He also explains that
one of the main upshots of this work is that while there are some promising defenses of petitionary prayer, these defenses are limited in scope and
have to reckon with many of the pressing challenges he has engaged with
throughout the book. Furthermore, he reiterates some of the intentional
limitations he imposed on his investigation, which have helped him focus
on particular philosophical issues, but also limit the practical implications
of his conclusion.
Overall, I find Davison’s investigation compelling; however, I will offer
a few friendly suggestions. First, his investigation of petitionary prayer
could benefit from a more detailed treatment of what constitutes the
object of a petitionary prayer, what components of a petitionary prayer
communicate this object, and what qualifies as bringing about the object.
Davison does not say much about how to determine the object of a petitionary prayer, instead he seems to assume the object is expressed by some
portion of what the petitioner articulates to God while she is praying. This
understanding of the object of a prayer seems intuitive, but it does not
help us make sense of the cases below. Take the following example of a
petitionary prayer and three ways in which God might respond:
Prayer: a person (S) prays for her mother to be healed from an illness
(E).
Response A: S’s mother is healed two months after S’s prayer.
Response B: S’s mother suffers intensely for the next thirty years, at
which point she is healed. A week after being healed she dies due to
unrelated causes.
Response C: S’s mother is never healed.
In responses A and B, God brings about what appears to be the object of
S’s prayer, while in response C he does not. If we add the assumption that
responses A and B fulfill the second two criteria of Davison’s CRA in addition to the first, then on Davison’s account they both count as answers
to S’s prayer. However, there is a sense in which response B does not seem
like a true answer to S’s prayer, or at the very least it seems like a clearly
worse answer than response A. We can make sense of this difference by
adding some intuitively plausible components to the original situation:
(1) S prays for E with a sense of urgency, and (2) one of S’s motivations for
prayer was her desire for her mother to live a significant portion of the rest
of her life in a relatively healthy and minimally painful state. Importantly,
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S does not articulate either of these two components as part of her prayer
for E. Although these two components seem to make an important difference to how we understand the object S requests and what counts as
an answer (or at least a good answer) to S’s prayer, it is unclear how they
would fit into Davison’s account of petitionary prayer. Take another case:
Prayer: a person (S) prays for a job as a teacher (E). S’s underlying but
unarticulated motivation for this prayer is that she wants to have a job
that she finds fulfilling.
Response A: S does not get a job as a teacher but instead gets a job as an
artist, which she finds fulfilling.
Response B: S gets a job as a teacher, which she does not find fulfilling.
Again, assuming the second two criteria of his CRA are fulfilled, according to Davison, response B is an answer to S’s prayer while response A is
not. However, response A seems clearly preferable to, and in some sense
a better answer than, response B. Similar to the first case above, in this
second case some component (S’s motivation) that is not addressed by
Davison’s account seems to make a crucial difference in which response is
preferable, and interestingly, in this case the mere response seems preferable to the answer.
It is important to note that my worry is not primarily about whether
we can properly classify certain responses as answers to petitionary
prayers—in fact, Davison sees it as a virtue of his account that it does
not provide criteria that enables precise classification. Rather, my worry is
that because Davison’s account is either underspecified or too narrow—in
terms of what features of the petitioner or the request itself inform either
the object of the prayer and/or what counts as bringing about the object
of prayer—it is unclear why we should care (at least as much as Davison
thinks we should) about receiving answers and having knowledge of answers to our prayers. In both cases above, God’s answering (according to
Davison’s account) S’s prayer is not what makes the particular response
preferable, rather it is the fact that God’s response satisfies some additional component (motivation, desire, etc.) either in addition to, or in place
of, S’s explicit request for the object of her prayer. This is both in tension
with what many religious believers think about answers to prayer and
seems to undercut (or at least call into question) some of Davison’s motivation for focusing on God’s answers to our petitionary prayers. Davison
may well have a helpful response to this worry—it is just unclear what it
would be, based on the level of detail he provides in his account.
Second, Davison’s account could also benefit from a clearer articulation
of the importance of the particular kind of knowledge that he focuses on—
namely, an individual’s knowledge that God has answered her particular
petitionary prayer. At the end of his epistemological discussion, Davison
concludes that I likely cannot know whether God has answered my particular petitionary prayer. In later chapters he references this conclusion
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in relation to many of the defenses that he addresses, often noting that
they suffer because we lack this kind of knowledge. For example, in addressing Stump’s defense of petitionary prayer that emphasizes the role
that such prayer plays in preventing humans from being either spoiled
or overwhelmed by God’s provision, Davison claims that Stump’s defense relies on an assumption that “created persons know that God has
answered their prayers, which is problematic, as we saw in chapters 4
and 5” (134–135). Davison makes a similar point in response to a defense
from Frances Howard-Snyder and Daniel Howard-Snyder which focuses
on the fact that petitionary prayer enables us to recognize and be grateful
to God as the source of good provision. Davison makes the point that this
defense is undermined by the fact that “created persons do not typically
know that they have received things from God as a result of petitionary
prayers” (131).
Although when engaging with some other defenses Davison provides
compelling explanations of why knowledge might be required for the
goods emphasized therein, and when engaging with at least one defense
he notes that the good in question may only require justified belief, when
engaging with the defenses above he does neither. Taking into account the
fact that traditional theists know both that God, in general, answers petitionary prayers and that God has answered some particular petitionary
prayers in the past—it seems plausible that one could rely on this knowledge to believe, quite reasonably, that God has answered their particular
petitionary prayers. And it further seems that these beliefs would suffice
for bringing about some of the goods Davison claims require knowledge.
For example, this belief could easily lead one to be grateful to God. In
short, in both examples mentioned above (in addition to others) it is not
yet clear from Davison’s discussion why the goods mentioned require
knowledge that God has answered one’s petitionary prayers, rather than
belief. Again, Davison may well have a good response to this—if so, his
earlier epistemological discussion as well as his discussion of these particular defenses’s epistemological issues could benefit from further explanation on this point.
As I mentioned above, these are friendly suggestions for further explanation of concepts that are central to Davison’s investigation. Petitionary
Prayer is a thorough and informative book-length treatment of a subject
that is woefully underdiscussed. Davison engages his many interlocuters
fairly and carefully, and in so doing gives a comprehensive overview of
the current state-of-play of the literature on this topic. Davison emphasizes that he hopes that his “discussion sheds new light on the philosophical issues, leads others to investigate them in further detail, and raises
new questions for further study” (6). In this, Petitionary Prayer has already
succeeded and will surely continue to do so!

